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Abstract 
We examined how people respond to time pressure factors in a complex, multi-stimulus 
environment. In Study 1, we manipulated time pressure by varying information load via 
stimulus complexity and the number of stimuli. In Study 2, we replaced the complexity 
manipulation with deadline – that is the time available to classify stimuli presented within a 
trial. We identified several ways that people can adapt to time pressure: Increasing the rate of 
information processing via effort or arousal, changing strategy by lowering response caution, 
and adjusting response bias. We tested these mechanisms using the LBA model of choice and 
response time (Brown & Heathcote, 2008). Whereas stimulus complexity influenced the 
quality of choice information, the number of stimuli influenced response caution, and 
deadline pressures caused a failure of encoding that was only partially compensated for by 
increased effort or arousal. Our results reveal that, rather than having a common response, 
people adapt, and fail to adapt, to the different time pressure factors in different ways.  
 
Public Significance Statement 
The paper shows that individuals use a range of cognitive strategies in response to time 
pressure in a multi-decision context. Such strategies include lowering the amount of 
information needed to make a decision and increasing effort. We found that the use of a given 
strategy depends on how time pressure is varied, whether it be the time available to make 
decisions or the number of decisions required. We found that these strategies can be 
ineffective as time pressure becomes excessive, and as a result, performance suffers, 
sometimes catastrophically.    
Keywords: Response time modeling, linear ballistic accumulator, task demands, workload & 
time pressure  
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There are many industries that require people to work under high levels of time 
pressure. Examples include aviation, emergency response, medicine, finance, and defence. 
Excessive time pressure is a risk, because it can impair performance, producing increases in 
response times and error rates, which can increase the risk of accidents and incidents 
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008). For this reason, there has been a long history of 
research attempting to identify the critical “redline” – the point at which the person does not 
have sufficient capacity to meet further demands, and thus performance deteriorates (Hart & 
Wickens, 2010). However, it has proven extremely difficult to identify a clear redline in most 
occupations, because people can manage their workload to ensure that performance remains 
within acceptable bounds (Loft, Sanderson, Neal, & Mooij, 2007). For example, people are 
thought to adapt to changes in time pressure by increasing effort, changing strategy or 
adjusting task priorities (Hendy, Liao, & Milgram, 1997; Neal, Ballard, & Vancouver, 2017; 
Raby & Wickens, 1994). Despite over 60 years of research into workload, the field lacks a 
formal model that explains the mechanisms underlying adaptation to time pressure. As a 
result, it is difficult to know how a person will adapt to changes in time pressure, and to 
identify the point at which performance is likely to deteriorate. 
Formal psychological models provide an explicit, mathematical description of the latent 
processes thought to be responsible for observed behaviours (Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010). 
Within the workload literature, researchers typically draw inferences about the way that 
people adapt to changes in time pressure by observing changes in performance, or from self-
report measures (Vidulich & Tsang, 2012). However, people may adapt to the same set of 
demands in multiple ways. As a result, verbally specified models are often ambiguous, and it 
is not clear whether the latent processes described in the verbal model are able to account for 
the data (Busemeyer & Diederich, 2010). Furthermore, if people can adapt in different ways, 
then the point at which performance will start to deteriorate will vary. As a result, there is 
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substantial variability in findings across studies, and it is hard to assess whether the same set 
of latent processes can account for the different patterns of behaviours across different 
studies. It is difficult for a field to make progress under these conditions.  
Our aim in this paper is to understand the mechanisms by which people adapt to 
changes in time pressure when performing a target detection task. We apply a cognitive 
accumulate-to-threshold decision-making model, the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA, 
Brown & Heathcote, 2008), to quantify these effects. We manipulated time pressure across 
two studies. In Study 1 we varied the amount of information that needs to be processed. In 
Study 2 we varied both the amount of information and the amount of time that is available to 
process it. We fit the LBA to participants’ performance and examined how the parameters of 
the model responded to the manipulations of time pressure. First, we review previous 
literature on time pressure effects, and then discuss how the mechanisms identified can be 
mapped to the parameters of the LBA. 
Adaptation to Time Pressure 
Resource based accounts of workload assume that the humans have limited information 
processing capacity (Kahneman, 1973). Capacity limits are explained using the concept of 
resources. Resources are a hypothetical construct, representing units or channels that process 
information (Navon & Gopher, 1979). The rate at which information is processed for a given 
task is determined by the amount of resources allocated to the task. The time required to 
complete a task is determined by the amount of information to be processed (bits of 
information) and the rate of processing (bits per second, Hendy et al., 1997). Time pressure is 
determined by the ratio of the time required to complete a task to the time available. An 
increase in time pressure can be caused by an increase in the amount of information to be 
processed within the time available, or a reduction of time available to process a given 
amount of information.  
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The critical redline of workload is the point at which supply can no longer meet 
demand, and is the breakpoint of performance, as the individual enters the “overload region”, 
such that they have no capacity to meet further demands and performance deteriorates (Hart 
& Wickens, 2010). The redline represents the point at which time required exceeds time 
available. If a redline can be identified, then measures can be put in place to ensure that 
workload does not cross that line (Young, Brookhuis, Wickens, & Hancock, 2015). However, 
surprisingly little progress has been made in identifying the elusive redline. Studies that have 
attempted to identify the overload region typically use self-report workload to measure 
cutoffs (e.g., Colle & Reid, 2005), yet self-reported workload is often dissociated from 
performance (Vidulich & Wickens, 1986; Appl Erg). Furthermore, objective performance 
measures often respond in different ways to workload manipulations, depending on the 
strategy that the person uses. Differences in strategy add to the fuzziness of the redline 
concept, because it means that there is no single point at which performance will degrade 
(Young et al., 2015).  
In principle, there are four ways in which people can adapt to changes in task demands: 
By increasing the rate of information processing to meet task demands; reducing the amount 
of information that is processed; prioritizing a subset of responses over others (e.g., by 
adjusting their response bias); or by extending the decision deadline or re-ordering the tasks 
(Hendy et al., 1997; Loft, Bolland, Humphreys, & Neal 2009). Extending the deadline or re-
ordering the tasks is only possible if the person has discretion over the timing and order of the 
tasks they perform. In the current paper, we examine tasks in which deadlines are imposed 
externally, and so we focus on the first three mechanisms.  
Rate of Information Processing  
Humphreys and Revelle (1984) argue that there are two mechanisms that regulate the 
rate of information processing. The first is arousal. As task demands increase, more resources 
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are thought to become available, which speeds up the rate of information processing. This is 
thought to be a relatively automatic response. The second is effort. If the demand for 
resources exceeds the supply, the person may reallocate resources from lower priority tasks, 
or from off-task activities, to the primary task to meet processing demands. Effort is thought 
to be a volitional response that is under motivational control. An individual will only exert 
greater effort if they are sufficiently motivated to maintain a desired level of performance 
(Hockey, 2013; Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; Neal et al., 2017). Increases in 
arousal and effort are thought to have the same effect, namely to increase the rate of 
information processing. 
There is surprisingly little in the way of direct evidence to support the assumption that 
people can change their rate of information processing in response to increases in time 
pressure. There is evidence, however, from dual-task paradigms that information-processing 
resources are limited, based on an inverse relationship between primary task demands and 
secondary task performance. Resource based accounts explain this finding by assuming that 
both tasks draw on a common resource pool, and that as additional resources are allocated to 
meet information processing demands on the primary task, fewer resources are available for 
the secondary task, and thus performance degrades (Navon & Gopher, 1979; Norman & 
Bobrow, 1976).  
Given that resources can never be directly observed, the dual-task paradigm provides 
indirect evidence for changes in rates of information processing. Although these inferences 
may be reasonable in tightly controlled experimental paradigms where it is possible to rule 
out alternative explanations, it is much more difficult to draw inferences about the availability 
and allocation of resources in complex and demanding tasks. For example, some 
manipulations of task demand may make the task too difficult for increased effort or arousal 
to compensate, potentially bringing into play alternative adaptations (Neal et al., 2017). It is, 
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therefore, difficult to assess whether the concepts of resources and information processing 
capacity are necessary or sufficient to account for a given set of behavioral data. Other 
sources of evidence suggesting changes in rates of information with task demands come from 
physiological measures, including cardiovascular, eye and brain activity (Zijlstra, 1993), and 
self-report (Earle, Hockey, Earle, & Clough, 2015). It is thought that these measures are 
indicators of either effort or arousal, because they correlate with task demands, however, 
once again it is unclear whether they reflect changes in the rate of information processing, or 
whether other mechanisms are involved.  
Information Reduction 
Hendy et al. (1997) argue that people can reduce the amount of information to be 
processed by changing their strategy for performing the task. This can be done in several 
ways, for example, by a change in the depth of processing (Donkin, Little, & Houpt, 2014) or 
by using simpler heuristics (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). In signal detection tasks, the 
primary way in which the load of information processing can be reduced is by trading 
accuracy for speed. The inverse relationship between speed and accuracy is referred to as a 
speed-accuracy tradeoff. The tradeoff between speed and accuracy have been observed in 
response to deadlines, incentive structures and response signals (e.g., Förster, Higgins, & 
Bianco, 2003; Pachella & Pew, 1968; Rae, Heathcote, Donkin, Averell, & Brown, 2014), and 
is pervasive across experimental and applied literature (Standage, Wang, Heitz, & Simen, 
2015), as well as in industry (Drury, 1994). Unless the individual is highly motivated to 
protect accuracy, they may change strategy in preference to increasing effort, as the latter is 
an aversive experience (Neal et al., 2017; Kool et al., 2010). 
Response Bias 
A response bias is a strategic preference for one response over the alternatives. For 
example, in classifying targets and non-targets, an individual may favour responding “target” 
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compared to responding “non-target”. Traditionally, it has been thought that individuals 
adjust their bias in response to payoffs and base rates. However, there is evidence that under 
some circumstances, people can adjust their bias in response to workload. Loft et al. (2009) 
presented air traffic controllers with pairs of aircraft that were on crossing tracks, and asked 
them to indicate whether they would intervene to assure separation between the aircraft (e.g., 
by changing the level of one of the aircraft). The false alarm rate was higher when controllers 
were under higher levels of workload, suggesting they applied a larger safety margin. Loft et 
al. (2009) argued that this shift in response bias was motivated by the desire to ensure safety 
over accuracy.  
Formally Modelling Adaption 
The arguments presented above suggest a range of different ways that people can adapt 
to changes in task demands. It is difficult to make inferences regarding these mechanisms 
from behavioral data alone, as there could be a combination of mechanisms being used. 
These effects may be obscured by changes in difficulty as demand increases, or by a bias for 
one response over another, making it difficult to infer how people adapt to changes in task 
demands from behavioral data alone. Formal models allow us to make such inferences, as 
they quantify the latent psychological processes hypothesised to be responsible for a set of 
behavioral data.  
Systems factorial technology (SFT; Townsend & Nozawa, 1995) represents one 
approach to this problem. SFT was developed to examine the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying the processing of multiple sources of information in specialized designs, such as 
double-factorial paradigms (see Townsend & Eidels, 2011, for a review of formal capacity 
measures). The response time distributions measured in these paradigms allow SFT to derive 
a capacity coefficient, quantifying changes in rates of information processing as the amount 
of information to be processed increases. Using the capacity coefficient, individuals can be 
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classified as having limited, unlimited, or super capacity if information processing rates 
decrease, remain unchanged, or increase with information load, respectively. For example, 
Eidels, Donkin, Brown and Heathcote (2010) found that while some individuals increased 
their rates of information processing when they had to process multiattribute stimuli 
compared to a single stimulus property, others’ processing was constant, or decreased with 
added information load.  
Although SFT was developed for high accuracy tasks, recent developments allow for 
the model to account for variations in accuracy (Townsend & Altieri, 2012). Nonetheless, 
SFT is limited in that it requires specialized and highly controlled designs that can be 
challenging to adapt to complex applied tasks. Furthermore, SFT does not differentiate 
between the different mechanisms that might underlie changes in capacity, such as changes in 
the rate of information processing and changes in strategy (but see Eidels et al., 2010 and 
Bushmakin, Eidels & Heathcote, 2017, for LBA-based approaches to modeling these factors 
in SFT paradigms). To address this problem, we need a cognitive model that explains how 
these different adaptive responses influence task performance. In the current paper, we use an 
accumulate-to-threshold model of decision making, the LBA (Brown & Heathcote, 2008), to 
identify these different mechanisms.  
Linear Ballistic Accumulator Model 
Accumulate-to-threshold models of decision-making have provided detailed accounts 
of the cognitive processes that underlie simple choices. Although the models vary in 
architecture and complexity, they share a common assumption, namely that the decision-
maker samples evidence from the environment until a threshold is reached, triggering a 
response. These models are able to account for accuracy, the full distribution of correct and 
error response times, as well as their complex interactions. This is achieved by first 
partitioning response times into decision time and non-decision time. The latter accounts for 
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the combined times to complete stimulus encoding and response production processes, and is 
assumed to have a constant value. A change in non-decision time causes a shift in the entire 
response time distribution without changing the variance or shape of the response time 
distribution. Decision time and response choices are accommodated by parameters reflecting 
the input and operation of the evidence accumulation process. The rate of evidence 
accumulation is determined by the difficulty of the task and the degree of attention allocated 
towards that information (i.e., effort or arousal). The threshold parameter indexes response 
caution – the amount of evidence required to make a response, which underlies the tradeoff 
between speed and accuracy.  
 The LBA (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; see Figure 1) is a mathematically tractable 
decision-making model that specifies linear, independent accumulators corresponding to each 
alternative response (e.g., “target” and “non-target” accumulators). For a given stimulus, each 
accumulator has its own normal distribution of evidence accumulation rates, with the mean 
rate v, and standard deviation sv. The normal distribution is truncated at zero, such that only 
positive drift values can be randomly sampled from the rate distributions. The start-point of 
accumulators is assumed to vary as a uniform distribution with a lower boundary of zero and 
an upper boundary, A. The model includes a threshold, b, for each response alternative, with 
the selected response being determined by the accumulator that reaches its threshold first. 
The distance from the top of the start point distribution to the threshold is denoted B. Finally, 
the model includes a non-decision time parameter, ter, reflecting sum of times for stimulus 
encoding and response production. 
The LBA accounts for changes in difficulty and speed of information processing via 
rate parameters. The accumulator for the correct response alternative is referred to as the 
“matching” accumulator, because the response that is produced by the accumulator 
“matches” the stimulus being presented. The accumulator for the incorrect response is 
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referred to as “mismatching” accumulator, because the response produced by the accumulator 
does not match the stimulus being presented. For example, when a target stimulus is 
presented, the target accumulator is the matching accumulator, while the non-target 
accumulator is the mismatching accumulator. In this case, the matching accumulator will 
produce a correct acceptance if it reaches the threshold before the mismatching accumulator. 
When a non-target stimulus is presented, the non-target accumulator is the matching 
accumulator, while the target accumulator is the mismatching accumulator. In this case, the 
matching accumulator will produce a correct rejection if it reaches the threshold before the 
mismatching accumulator.   
An increase in the rate of information processing that reflects heightened effort or 
arousal could be indexed by an increase in the drift rate for both the matching and 
mismatching accumulator. The mean drift rate has been shown to converge with SFT’s 
capacity measure (Eidels et al., 2010). A change in the difficulty of the choice, by contrast, 
affects the quality of information that the person is able to extract, which is indexed by the 
difference between the matching and mismatching rates. When performance is at chance, the 
drift rate for the matching accumulator equals that of the mismatching accumulator, as the 
two accumulators have an equal chance of triggering a response assuming an equal threshold. 
As it becomes easier to discriminate between the correct and incorrect response, the 
difference in rate between the matching and mismatching accumulator increases; specifically, 
the mean of the matching accumulator should be greater than the mismatching accumulator. 
As noted earlier, it is possible that people may compensate for an increase in difficulty by 
applying more effort (Neal et al., 2017). This could be reflected in greater attention to 
diagnostic stimulus attributes (i.e., attributes relevant to the choice), which would produce an 
increase in information quality, and hence produce a greater difference between match and 
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mismatch rates. We use rate estimates to determine whether different time pressure 
manipulations differentially affect the overall rate and quality of information processing.  
 The LBA accounts for strategic changes in the amount of evidence accumulated and in 
response bias via the threshold parameter. Figure 1 shows how adjusting the threshold 
parameter can account for speed-accuracy tradeoffs. Since the start point parameter is 
randomly sampled from a uniform distribution, on some trials the non-target accumulator will 
start closer to the threshold compared to the target accumulator, and vice-versa. In the case 
shown in Figure 1, the non-target accumulator has a greater start point compared to the target 
accumulator. With an equal threshold for both accumulators, the initial greater start-point 
allows the non-target accumulator to reach its threshold first, resulting in a non-target 
response regardless of the non-target accumulator having a lower rate of evidence 
accumulation. However, the greater start point for the non-target accumulator can be 
overcome by setting a higher threshold. Specifically, since the target accumulator rate is 
greater than the non-target accumulator, indicated by the steeper line, a sufficiently high 
threshold would result in a target response. Setting a higher threshold overcomes the 
differences in start points, which are assumed to occur randomly from trial to trial, and thus 
increases accuracy. However, this comes at the expense of a greater response time, as it takes 
longer for the accumulator to reach the threshold.  
Threshold parameters also account for response biases, by allowing threshold values to 
differ between response alternatives. All else being equal, having a lower threshold for one 
response compared another means that the accumulator has lesser distance to travel. 
Therefore, the accumulator is more likely to reach its lower threshold first, and will trigger 
the corresponding response more frequently. Thus, the favoured response will occur more 
quickly and more frequently than the response with a higher threshold.    
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The LBA and other accumulate-to-threshold models are able to separate the different 
effects of latent cognitive processes that are conflated in observed data. The term “selective 
influence” describes the idea that the effect of a manipulation is captured by a single model 
parameter. For example, changes in difficulty are commonly reflected in the quality of 
evidence that can be extracted from the stimulus but have no influence on response caution 
and response bias (i.e., thresholds), at least when the changes in difficulty are not predictable. 
Selective influence has practical as well as theoretical implications. For example, if difficulty 
affects only rates there is little point attempting to ameliorate its effects with interventions 
targeting response strategies. However, studies using relatively simple choice tasks suggest 
that task demands may sometimes influence several cognitive processes. For example, when 
increases in difficulty are predicable participants often try to compensate by increasing 
thresholds. Therefore, we test for such failures of selective influence in circumstances where 
they might reasonably occur, such as when time pressure manipulations are predictable.  
Accumulate-to-threshold models have been used previously to test selective influence 
in a range of relatively simple laboratory paradigms, such as perceptual discrimination, 
lexical decision and recognition memory tasks. For example, Rae et al. (2014) found that in 
all of these tasks participants reduced their threshold when instructed to emphasize speed 
over accuracy, as is conventionally assumed. However, contravening these assumptions, they 
also observed an increase in the rate of evidence accumulation in the accuracy condition, 
concluding that prioritizing accuracy results in an increase in the quality of information 
processed. Dambacher and Hübner (2015) found similar effects with a deadline manipulation, 
such that thresold and rates declined with tighter deadlines. They also observed that non-
decision time decreased when participants had tighter deadlines.   
Palada and colleagues (2016) extended this approach to a more complex task, testing 
whether the LBA was capable of accounting for performance on a simulation involving a 
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navigation and target classification task that is more representative of the types of tasks found 
in applied settings. They found that the LBA was able to provide an accurate characterization 
of all aspects of performance even though multiple stimuli were simultaneously present in the 
display, and participants were free to decide how they allocated their attention amongst tasks 
and stimuli. The study included manipulations of time pressure, specifically the number of 
stimuli requiring classification, and the perceptual difficulty of stimuli. In line with 
conventional assumptions, time pressure selectively influenced threshold, with a decline in 
response caution under greater load, but did not influence the rate of information processing 
or response bias. Again, in line with conventional assumptions, their manipulation of 
perceptual difficulty selectively influenced rates, with poorer discrimination under greater 
difficulty; as difficulty increased, the difference between the rates of the matching and 
mismatching accumulators decreased. 
 There were several shortcomings in Palada et al. (2016) that limit the inferences that 
can be made about how individuals adapt to time pressure. Firstly, participants could control 
the order in which they attended to stimuli, and so could potentially switch attention back and 
forth between stimuli before making a classification on any one. In contrast, the modelling 
assumed that stimuli were processed one at a time. Palada et al. provided evidence that the 
modelling assumptions was fulfilled by scoring response time beginning from the last 
response, but noted that there was still some potential inaccuracy. Such inaccuracies would 
occur if processing of the next stimulus began during the period that the response to the last 
stimulus was being produced, if processing was interrupted by the secondary task which 
alarmed when performance degraded, and if processing of a stimulus was interrupted because 
it exited the screen, resulting in an overestimation of the subsequent response time as it would 
include the partial processing time of the previous stimulus. In the present studies, we took a 
more controlled approach, enforcing serial processing by requiring participants to unmask 
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and decide about each stimulus sequentially. This allowed response time to be 
unambiguously defined from the point at which a stimulus is unmasked.  We also removed 
the secondary task.  
A second limitation is that Palada et al. (2016) used a range of randomly varying 
stimulus configurations that differed markedly with respect to the difficulty of the target vs. 
non-target classification. The hypothesis that the heterogeneity of stimulus difficulty would 
be accounted for by the rate variability parameter was supported, with target variability being 
greater than non-target variability. The heterogeneity of target difficulty effect was further 
explored in a post-hoc analysis by specifying “easy” target and “hard” target subtypes. The 
variability effects dropped out of the selected model, and the model accounted for the 
differences in easy and hard target effects via the mean rate parameter. However, the 
conclusions made from the post-hoc modeling were limited, as it lacked power due to 
insufficient observations within cells after having broken down targets into subtypes. In the 
present study, stimulus difficulty is balanced and its effects are explicitly modeled. We 
expect stimulus difficulty to be captured by a change in inputs to the decision process (i.e., a 
rate effect), though we also examine whether individuals adapt to difficulty by changes in 
response caution (i.e., a threshold effect) as well.  
The third limitation is that Palada et al. (2016) only manipulated one factor affecting 
time pressure, namely the number of stimuli to be processed. A range of factors influence 
time pressure, including the number of stimuli, stimulus complexity, and the time available. It 
is not known whether people respond to these factors in the same way, suggesting a single 
mechanism mediating all time pressure effects, or whether the factors have independent 
selective influences, or some combination of the two. Consistent with there being more than 
one mechanism, the factors determining time pressure have been shown to have independent 
effects on perceived time pressure (Hendy et al., 1997; Loft et al., 2007).  
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In our studies, we manipulated three time pressure factors. In our first experiment, we 
re-examined the effects of the complexity and number of stimuli using our more controlled 
design, both in terms of attention and stimulus difficulty. In our second experiment, we 
examined how individuals adapt to changes in the number of stimuli and deadline. This 
examination of a broad range of factors aimed to provide a more detailed understanding of 
how individuals adapt to time pressure.  
Experiments and Model Variants 
Both experiments used a dynamic target-detection task. Participants had to classify 
ships as targets or non-targets as they moved across the screen. We manipulated time 
pressure by varying the number of stimuli to be processed, the complexity of the stimulus, 
and the time available to make the response, and used model selection to examine how these 
variables influenced the parameters of the model. For both studies, we tested a set of 
alternative models describing the different ways in which the experimental variables could 
influence threshold, rate and non-decision time parameters. In doing so, we could also test 
whether the time pressure manipulations had similar or different effects on adaptations to 
time pressure. We identified the best account of the observed data by using model selection 
techniques that factor in both the simplicity of the model and its goodness-of-fit.  
In fitting the LBA to the observed behaviours, we used the model selection strategies 
outlined in Donkin et al. (2011). The model was fit using maximum likelihood estimation. 
Having fit several alternative models that vary in their parameterizations, we selected the 
model that had the best tradeoff between simplicity and goodness-of-fit via Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), where AIC = D + 2p. The term D (-2 times the maximized log-
likelihood) quantifies model deviance, and is a measure of model misfit analogous to sums of 
squares errors for a Gaussian model. The term 2p penalizes models with more parameters, so 
unless adding a parameter decreases the deviance by more than two, AIC rejects the more 
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complex model. Having determined the AIC selected models, we examined their goodness-
of-fit graphically to determine if they account for the effects of the experimental 
manipulations error rates and on response time distributions. We examined both error and 
correct response times, quantifying fast, median and slow responses as the 10th, 50th and 
90th percentiles of the response time distribution. Finally, we analyzed the estimated 
parameter values to examine the effects of our time pressure manipulations on decision-
making processes, and how individuals adapted to time pressure.     
The set of model variants were generated from a highly flexible “top” model, which 
will necessarily fit the data best. The simpler models introduce restricted parameterizations, 
with the simplest model having the same parameter values across all experimental factors 
except for the flexibility to perform better than chance (by allowing a rate difference between 
match and mismatch accumulators). As such, the simplest model estimates a single value for 
the parameters B, A, sv, ter, whereas two values are estimated for v – one corresponding to 
each accumulator. The simplest model was fit first and thereafter, the best-fitting values 
informs the optimization algorithm start-point for the next model variant where one extra 
factor is introduced. This method continues up until the top model is fitted, with more 
complex models fit from many different start points, and reduces the chance of the fitting 
procedure finding sub-optimal solutions (Donkin et al., 2011; for examples, see Heathcote & 
Love, 2012, Palada et al., 2016, and Rae et al., 2014).  
The architecture of the LBA introduces two accumulator-related factors, a response (R) 
factor and a match (M) factor. The R factor accounts for the alternative responses, in our 
experiment being either a “target” or “non-target” response, and enables the estimation of 
response bias by allowing for a lower threshold value for the favored response (e.g., a lower 
threshold for the target response would indicate a “target” bias). The M factor accounts for 
the match or mismatch between accumulator and stimulus (e.g., if a non-target stimulus is 
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presented, then the match level corresponds to the non-target accumulator and the mismatch 
level corresponds to the target accumulator). Above chance performance is accommodated by 
allowing the rate (v) to be greater for the match than mismatch accumulator. Doing so means 
that the matching (i.e., correct) accumulator has a greater chance of sampling a higher rate of 
evidence accumulation than the mismatching (i.e., incorrect) accumulator and so that the 
matching accumulator is more likely to reach its threshold first and trigger a correct response. 
The difference between the matching and mismatching accumulator’s rates, when 
standardized by the rate standard deviation, is analogous to d’ in signal detection theory.  
There were two experimental factors common to both studies: stimulus type (S) and 
number of stimuli (NS). A third factor was complexity (C) in Study 1 and deadline (D) in 
Study 2. Using the model selection method, there is an exponential increase in the number of 
possible model variants that can be generated from the top model as a function of the sum of 
the number of factors (NF) mapped to each model parameter, for a total of 2NF models 
(Donkin et al., 2011). The computational demands of model fitting procedures meant that it 
was not feasible to specify a top model where all model parameters could vary by all 
experimental factors. We outline the assumptions that allowed us to reduce the complexity, 
and therefore computational demands, of fitting the set of LBA model variants.   
Firstly, it is circular to argue that the stimulus factors related to the choice (i.e., 
whether the ship is a target or non-target) adjusts the accumulator-related processes, as these 
stimulus properties are only known once an accumulator reaches its threshold. Hence, there is 
a strong argument that accumulator-related parameters (A and B) should not be influenced by 
stimulus factors that are not known at to the start of a trial. We also assumed that non-
decision times did not differ between stimulus types, corresponding with the assumption that 
encoding and response production times do not differ between targets and non-targets. 
Further, we assumed that time pressure manipulations would not influence rate variability 
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(sv), though we did allow rate variability to be a function of the match factor (for examples 
using the same approach see Palada et al., 2016 and Strickland, Heathcote, Remington, & 
Loft, 2017). We estimated a single value for the start point parameter (A) for all conditions. 
Although this assumption is not necessary, the A parameter is hard to estimate and rarely 
been found to account for experimental effects (for an exception see Heathcote & Hayes, 
2012).  
The top models for each study are outlined in Table 1, with both having 67 
parameters. One accumulator parameter must have a fixed value to make the model 
identifiable (Donkin, Brown, & Heathcote, 2009); we fixed sv for the non-target mismatching 
accumulator to one. With these limitations, 512 models were fit to each participant for each 
study.  
 
Study 1: Information Load  
The first study examines how individuals adapt to time pressure factors that determine 
information load – that is the amount of information to be processed. We manipulated two 
factors that are representative of applied situations: The complexity of the stimuli, and the 
number of stimuli requiring classification. The complexity factor determines the amount of 
information that needs processing to classify a single stimulus, whereas the number of stimuli 
acts as a multiplier and determines the total required amount of information processing within 
the time available. In line with Palada et al. (2016), we hypothesise that participants will 
respond to an increase in the number of stimuli by lowering their threshold. We further 
hypothesise that complexity will influence the inputs to the decision process, i.e., a rate 
effect, as complexity is a property of the stimulus. Because complexity is unknown at the 
start of the trial it seems likely that it will not affect thresholds. However, the decisions in this 
task are relatively slow, so it is possible that this may enable at least a limited change in 
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response caution or response bias; we used rigorous model selection procedures to test these 
possibilities, as well as potential effects of complexity on stimulus encoding and hence non-
decision time.   
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-eight undergraduate students from the University of Queensland participated in 
the study in return for course credit. The sample included 30 females and 28 males, with a 
mean age of 19.87 years (SD = 5.10).  
Experimental Task 
The target detection task presented a UAV camera ocean view with multiple ships 
synchronously passing the camera’s field of view (see Figure 2). The ocean view included 
five ship lanes, and ships were positioned on adjacent lanes. Within discrete trials, ships 
transitioned into the screen, entering from the right and moving leftwards across the screen at 
a constant speed of 247 pixels/s, making responding possible over a 9s period (from when the 
front of the 300-pixel length ship appeared on the right of the screen of width 1920 pixels 
until the front of the ship had disappeared on the left). There was a 1s interval between trials. 
Peripheral ships were masked, so that at any given point in time all resources were 
allocated to the focal ship requiring classification. Ships were unmasked beginning from the 
bottom lane, and working upwards; once the participant had classified the visible ship, the 
next ship lane positioned above was unmasked, and the classified ship’s lane was masked. 
Arrows indicated the position of ships within masked ship lanes; classified ship’s arrows 
were filled with the corresponding classification colour, whereas unclassified ships had an 
unfilled arrow with a yellow border. Response boxes travelled synchronously above each 
ship. Participants made a target or non-target classification by clicking on the green or red 
portion of the response box, respectively. Participants were unable to reclassify ships. 
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Representative of applied contexts involving surveillance footage, the simulation included 
noise via dynamic grey-scale noise overlay, and individual ships were obscured by a fog 
overlay of constant opacity (65%).  
Experimental Design  
The experiment had three within-subject factors producing 18 conditions: stimulus type 
(target and non-target), complexity (3-, 5-, and 7-feature rule), and number of stimuli per trial 
(2, 3, and 4 ships). Stimulus type (target vs. non-target) was defined by a classification rule 
that specified the number of features that needed to by present for the ship to be a target. The 
features included an anchor, crane, fishing line, life boat, mast, smokestack and flag.  
Complexity and number of ship factors created nine time pressure conditions. There 
were 30 trials at each level of time pressure, with trials from each level blocked to avoid the 
convolution of complexity rules. The order of presentation of the nine time pressure blocks 
was randomized for each participant. The levels for the manipulations of complexity and 
number of stimuli were calibrated based on pilot data from the same population to ensure 
substantial difference in performance across experimental conditions, and to avoid floor or 
ceiling effects.  
Complexity was manipulated by varying the number of features in the decision rule. 
The features had fixed positions on the ship, and were either present or absent. Participants 
had to count the total number of features on the ship. In the least complex condition, 
participants used a three-feature rule. Up to three features could be present on the ship, and 
the rule specified that any two of the three possible features needed to be present for the ship 
to be a target. In the intermediate condition, participants used a five-feature rule. Up to five 
features could be present; any three of the five possible features needed to be present for the 
ship to be a target. In the most complex condition, participants used a seven-feature rule. Up 
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to seven features could be present; any four out of the seven possible features needed to be 
present for the ship to be a target.  
 The number of possible ship configurations (i.e., the presence and absence of features) 
for rule is a function of 2n, where n represents the maximum number of features. As such, the 
3-, 5-, and 7-feature rules produced, respectively, 8, 32, and 128 possible ship configurations, 
half of which were consistent with a target definition. For each trial, the simulation randomly 
selected a target or not target, and then randomly selected one of the possible corresponding 
ship configurations.  
Two stimulus sets were created to control for potential heterogeneity in the difficulty of 
identifying individual features. In set A, the 3-feature rule included a crane, mast and flag, 
while the 5-feature rule also included a fishing rod and life boat. In set B, the 3-feature rule 
included an anchor, crane and life boat, while the 5-feature rule also included a mast and 
smoke stack. The 7-feature rule was consistent across both sets, and included all features. Use 
of the two stimulus sets were counterbalanced across participants.  
Procedure. 
Initially, participants viewed an audio-visual presentation of task instructions. A 5-
minute training phase was completed, exposing participants to all nine levels of time 
pressure. Participants were first presented with a block of trials using the 3-feature rule; three 
trials were completed with 2 stimuli, followed by three trials with 3 stimuli, finishing with 
three trials with 4 stimuli. The same order was then completed using the 5-feature rule, and 
then the 7-feature rule. Before each block, participants were informed of which classification 
rule they should use. During training participants could refer to a handout outlining the 
classification rules. In training, participants received feedback for each response; a green tick 
for correct or a red cross for incorrect responses travelled behind classified ships. After 
training, the experimenter asked if the participant understood the task. When necessary, 
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clarifications were made by the experimenter. Once the participant stated that they 
understood the task requirements, the classification rules handout was removed, and the 
participant commenced the experimental phase of the study. In attempts to reduce shifts in 
decision-making strategies as the participants progressed through the experimental trials, 
feedback was not provided. Overall, the experiment lasted an hour. Ethical approval for this 
study was granted by the School of Psychology at the University of Queensland, Australia.  
Results  
Initially, we examined experimental effects on manifest behaviour. Stimulus set was 
entered as a control variable, and is not included in the interpretation of results. We analyzed 
non-response rates and accuracy using a generalized linear mixed-model (GLMM) specifying 
a binomial distribution with a probit link function, whereas response time measures were 
analysed with GLMM specifying a Gaussian distribution. Analyses were conducted using the 
R package lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014), and inferences made via Wald 
χ2 tests with type III sums of squares as implemented by the car package (Fox & Weisberg, 
2011).  
Non-Response Rates 
Mean non-response rates were 2.01% (SD = 5.34%). Due to having insufficient 
observations for model fitting, we removed one participant with 39% missing data. 
Remaining participants had 10% missing data or less, leaving a sample of 57 participants. 
There was a significant three-way interaction between complexity, number of stimuli, and 
stimulus type on non-responses (see Figure 4; c2(4) = 10.86, p = .028). Non-response rates 
were similar across conditions, except for the four-ship conditions, where complexity had a 
stronger effect for non-targets compared to targets. Given the small percentage of non-
responses (with the highest mean value of 3.15% across conditions; see Figure 4), it seems 
unlikely that this interaction would have a substantial effect on the remaining results. 
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Although all other interactions and main effects did not approach significance (ps > .145), 
Figure 4 shows a trend for an increased in non-response rates with an increasing in the 
number of ships (p = .150).  
Accuracy and Response Times  
Response times outside of 0.5s and 6s were removed from statistical analyses and 
model fits; 0.52% of data was censored, with at most 4.11% of data removed from a given 
participant. Consistent with the usual practice with simple choice tasks, the lower cutoff was 
selected because lesser response times would be insufficient to make the decision required in 
our task. The upper cutoff was quite long to account for the slower and more variable 
performance in our complex task, with only a small percentage of slow responses being 
removed.  
We analyzed four response time-based measures (mean and standard deviation for 
correct and error responses) and error rates. Predictors included within-subject experimental 
factors (stimulus type, number of stimuli and complexity). Table 2 summarises the results for 
all measures. There was a three-way interaction involving error rates; complexity increased 
errors, however this effect only occurred for targets, and became stronger as the number of 
stimuli increased (see left panel in Figure 5). 
Correct and incorrect responses became faster and less variable as the number of 
stimuli increased. However, for correct response time there was an interaction between 
complexity and number of stimuli, such that response times slowed with increased 
complexity, and this effect was stronger when there were fewer ships in a trial (see right 
panel in Figure 5). In summary, a complex speed accuracy tradeoff was observed in response 
to number of stimuli and complexity. For non-targets, responses became faster and slightly 
less accurate as the number of stimuli increased. For targets, this speed-accuracy tradeoff in 
response to the number of ships was more pronounced as complexity increased. Response 
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time variability decreased with a greater number of ships for correct (0.93, 0.81, 0.71) and 
incorrect (0.92, 0.81, 0.72) responses.  
Model Selection and Fits  
The fits for the top model and the AIC-selected model is shown in Table 3. The AIC-
selected model did not fit significantly worse than the top model, c2(2052) = 759, p > .999, 
and had less than half the number of parameters. As the AIC selected variant provided the 
best account of the data in terms of goodness-of-fit and number of parameters, we focus on it 
in further analyses.  
The model accounted for the effects of complexity via rate (v) and number of stimuli 
via threshold (B). Both factors also influenced non-decision time (ter). Differences in 
responses to target and non-target stimuli were accounted for by mean rate (v) and rate 
standard deviation (sv), as well as by differences in threshold (i.e., a response bias). 
Figure 6 shows the goodness-of-fit for the selected model. The model provides an 
accurate account of the trends in accuracy and response time, capturing the difference in 
accuracy between target and non-targets, as well as the strong effect of number of stimuli on 
response times. There is some systematic underestimation of response times at the .5 and .9 
quantiles for the 2-ship condition, but the “top” model did not provide a better fit. The 
underestimation could have occurred because in the 2-ship condition participants 
occasionally took advantage of the lack of time pressure to recheck the ship configuration 
(i.e., accumulate evidence for a second time), thus slowing responses. However, this effect 
appears relatively minor, and so we now consider how the AIC model parameter estimates 
explain the observed experimental effects 
Experimental Effects on Parameters  
We analyzed model parameters with GLMMs assuming Gaussian distributions. The 
“target” threshold was significantly lower than the “non-target” threshold (1.91 vs. 2.09, 
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respectively), c2(1) = 4.80, p = .028, indicating a target response bias. Threshold decreased as 
the number of stimuli increased (2.82, 1.93, 1.24), c2(2) = 151.97, p < .001, and this effect 
was additive with the response factor.  
There was a three-way interaction between complexity, match factor and stimulus type 
on rate, c2(2) = 9.23, p = .010. Figure 7 reveals that, in trials where targets were presented, 
the difference in rate for the matching (i.e., correct) accumulator and mismatching (i.e., 
incorrect) accumulator became smaller as complexity increased, thus increasing the chances 
of the mismatching accumulator sampling a higher rate and reaching its threshold first, 
resulting in an incorrect response. For non-targets, complexity had little effect on the 
difference in rates between accumulators, with the matching accumulator having a higher rate 
than the mismatching accumulator, regardless of complexity. As the difference between the 
matching and matching accumulators is analogous to discriminability, the three-way 
interaction suggests that an increase in the complexity of the decision rule made it harder to 
identify targets, but had relatively little effect on participants’ ability to identify non-targets.  
 There was a trend for drift variability being greater for the mismatching (1.00) than the 
matching accumulator (0.81), though this did not achieve significance (p = .078). The main 
effect of stimulus type and its interaction with the match factor were non-significant (ps > 
.614). Finally, we found a significant increase in non-decision times with an increase in the 
number of stimuli (0.35s, 0.39s, 0.46s), c2(2) = 20.04, p < .001; the main effect of complexity 
and its interaction with number of stimuli were non-significant (ps > .816). 
Discussion 
In this study, we tested the effects of information load on adapting to time pressure. In 
line with Palada et al. (2016), we varied the number of stimuli requiring classification. 
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Additionally, we manipulated stimulus complexity. Both manipulations changed the level of 
time pressure, but had different effects on the parameters of the LBA.  
Our manipulation of the number of stimuli, although analogous to Palada et al. (2016), 
used trials with a predetermined number of ships, rather than a probabilistic manipulation to 
draw the number of ships presented a 3-minute period. Regardless of this difference, like 
Palada et al., we found that participants did not respond to the number of stimuli by changing 
their rate of information processing. Rather, the number of stimuli selectively influenced 
threshold; participants strategically lowered their threshold when more ships were present, 
prioritizing the speed over the accuracy of their choices to reduce non-responses. However, 
this strategy was not completely effective, as evidenced by the trend for non-responses rates 
to increase with the number of stimuli (see Figure 4).  
Contrary to Palada et al. (2016), who did not observe changes in non-decision times, we 
found that non-decision times slowed with a greater number of ships. It seems likely that the 
locus of the divergence in findings is stimulus encoding time, rather than response production 
time, because stimulus features differed across the studies, whilst response modalities were 
identical. However, the evidence for this effect was weak, as we explain below when 
describing additional analyses.  
Increasing the complexity of the stimuli made it harder to identify targets, but had no 
effect on non-target accuracy. The model explained these findings by the difference between 
matching and mismatching rates. The difference was much less for targets than non-targets 
overall, and for targets it decreased as complexity increased, whereas the difference was 
constant for non-targets.  
Participants appear to have attempted to compensate for the difficulty of targets with a 
bias to respond target (i.e., setting a lower threshold for targets than non-targets), however, 
threshold and response bias did not vary as a function of complexity. Although the lower 
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target threshold would have slightly improved performance on target trials, as the target 
accumulator had lesser distance to travel, this was overshadowed by the rate effects. 
Specifically, the difference between accumulator rates for non-target trials means that it was 
unlikely for the mismatching (i.e., target) accumulator to reach its lower threshold first, 
resulting in infrequent errors on non-target trials. Note, however, that additional analyses 
described below suggests that there is overall weak evidence for this target bias. We found no 
evidence that participants adapted to changes in complexity by adjusting their overall rate of 
information processing, as the main effect of complexity on rate was non-significant.  
 Consistent with Palada et al.’s (2016) supplementary analysis, which accounted for 
easy and hard targets, our controlled manipulation of complexity did not influence drift 
variability. Therefore, the demands of complexity were homogenous between target and non-
targets. The stimulus factor was, however, selected by the AIC model as affecting rate 
variability, though the main effect of stimulus type on rate variability was non-significant. 
This suggests that, although on average there was no main effect, there were individual 
differences, with the selected model suggesting that targets sometimes had more or less 
variability in rates than non-targets.  
Given that ships transitioned into the screen, participants could not immediately process 
all ship features on the first visible ship during the early period of response time. Thus, the 
stimulus encoding time for the first ship may have been slowed compared to subsequent 
ships. To test this possibility, we fit the AIC selected model and introduced a new ship order 
factor (first ship vs. subsequent ships) and allowed it to influence non-decision time. 
Introducing the ship order effect significantly improved model fit compared to the original 
model, c2(513) = 11894, p < .001. Non-decision time was significantly greater for the first 
ship compared to subsequent ships (0.97s vs 0.27s, c2(2) = 251.35, p < .001). The parameter 
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estimate for the first ship condition is in line with the time it took for the first ship to 
transition into the screen, and the estimate for subsequent ships condition is in line with 
conventional studies when all stimulus features are presented simultaneously. The model 
provided the same explanation for the number of ships on threshold, and complexity on 
discriminability, though the target response bias and the effect of number of ships on non-
decision time were no longer significant.  
 In this study, our modeling suggests that participants partially responded to 
information load. Stimulus complexity influenced rate, particularly the quality of information 
for targets. There was some evidence that participants responded to this effect by adopting a 
target response bias; however, as the difference in response thresholds was only minor, and 
did not vary with complexity, target accuracy declined considerably with complexity. This 
suggests that participants were approaching the redline as they did not effectively compensate 
for the increase in complexity. In contrast, participants responded to the number of stimuli by 
adjusting their threshold. In doing so, there was only a minor drop in performance as 
additional ships were presented, and thus participants avoided the redline by adjusting their 
strategy.  
Study 2: Information Load and Time Available 
The previous study examined how people adapt to changes in information load caused 
by changes in the complexity and number of stimuli. In Study 2, we kept complexity 
constant, using the medium difficulty (5-feature) classification rule, and added a deadline 
manipulation (i.e., the time available to complete a trial) to the manipulation of the number of 
ships in each trial. Given previous research suggesting that deadline influences threshold 
(Dambacher & Hübner, 2015), we were interested in whether an interaction would occur 
between number of stimuli and deadline on threshold, or whether we would find a selective 
influence of each factor. Hence, we factorially manipulated the number of stimuli in a trial, 
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using the same three levels as in the Study 1, and trial deadline, so that the time available to 
classify the ships within a trial was either less than, equal to, or greater than the time 
available in Study 1. In line with previous research, we hypothesised that both time pressure 
factors would influence threshold, such that people would respond to greater time pressure by 
lowering their threshold in a dynamic environment. 
 Study 1 blocked the presentation of time pressure conditions to avoid participants 
experiencing confusion about which classification rule to follow on a given trial. However, 
applied decision making often takes place in an uncertain and dynamic environment. For 
example, air traffic controllers have to be able to adapt to changes in time pressure caused by 
changes in traffic, weather, schedules, and unexpected events (e.g., airspace closures or 
aircraft emergencies). For this reason, we explored a more realistic scenario where time 
pressure conditions varied randomly between trials. Note that participants could become 
aware of the level of time pressure before they responded on a trial because of the speed at 
which ships transitioned into the screen, where all features on the ships were not fully visible 
until about 1.0-1.5s into the trial. Hence, as in Study 1, participants could in theory make 
different strategic adjustments for different time pressure conditions, although this may have 
required more flexibility than under the blocked conditions of Study 1.  
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-three undergraduate students from the University of Queensland completed the 
study in exchange for course credit. The group included 30 females and 28 males. Mean age 
was 19.49 years (SD = 3.87).  
Experimental Task, Design and Procedure 
Study 2 used the same target detection task as in Study 1. There were 18 within-subject 
experimental conditions: stimulus type (target and non-target), deadline (6, 9, and 12s), and 
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number of stimuli (2, 3, and 4 ships). The conditions were also calibrated based on pilot data 
using a sample from the same population. Thirty trials were completed for each of the nine 
conditions that were created by crossing deadline and number of stimuli. The presentation of 
conditions was randomized.  
The stimulus type and number of stimuli manipulations were identical to Study 1. We 
manipulated deadline by varying the speed at which ships travelled (6s: 370 pixels/s, 9s: 247 
pixels/s, and 12s: 185 pixels/s), and thus the time available to classify the ship. The 5-feature 
rule from Study 1 was used across all conditions, and we included the same between-person 
ship configuration manipulation.  
The same procedure was used as Study 1. The 5-minute training phase consisted of nine 
blocks, starting with a 12s deadline and three trials for 2, 3, and then 4 ship conditions; this 
sequence was then repeated for the 9s deadline and then the 6s deadline. This fixed order was 
adopted to make it easier for participants to cope with the more demanding short-deadline 
conditions. Thereafter, participants completed experimental trials. Ethical approval for this 
study was granted by the School of Psychology at the University of Queensland, Australia. 
Results  
We used corresponding censoring and statistical procedures in Study 1. Mean non-
response rates were 3.25% (SD = 3.86%). We removed three participants with non-response 
rates greater than 10% (11%, 20%, 22%), resulting in a final sample of 60 participants. Non-
response rates increased with number of stimuli in a trial (0.74%, 1.33%, 4.29%; c2(2) = 
95.45, p < .001), and shorter response deadlines (6.72%, 0.76%, 0.07%; c2(2) = 11.14, p = 
.004). The remaining main effects and interactions were non-significant (ps > .290).  
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Accuracy and Response Times  
We used the same criterion and reasoning from Study 1 to censor response times 
outside the range of 0.5s and 6s; 0.45% of the data was removed, with at most 0.99% 
removed from a given participant. Table 4 summarises the results for behavioural measures 
and experimental effects. There were significant interactions between stimulus type, number 
of stimuli and deadline on error rates and mean correct response time (see Figure 8). Error 
rates increased with tighter deadline, and this effect was stronger for targets than non-targets. 
The interaction between stimulus type and deadline became weaker as the number of stimuli 
increased. Figure 8 also reveals chance accuracy for targets classified under a 6s deadline 
across all number-of-stimulus conditions, whereas non-target accuracy remained well above 
chance.   
Correct response times generally sped up with tighter deadlines and an increase in the 
number of stimuli. Trends were similar for targets and non-targets; however, for target ships 
there was little difference in response times between 9s and 12s deadlines. Participants took 
more time for non-target decisions in the 12s than 9s condition, yet improved very little in 
accuracy. In contrast, they did not appear to make use of the additional time available in the 
12s condition, yet target accuracy was much better than in the 9s condition (see Figure 8).  
Model Selection and Fits  
Table 5 shows the fits for the top model and AIC-selected model. The reduction in fit 
for the AIC-selected relative to the top model was not significant, c2(2700) = 818, p > .999. 
The AIC-selected model has less than a quarter of the number of parameters compared to the 
top model. Hence, we selected the AIC variant as providing the most parsimonious account 
of the data, and focus on this model in further analyses.  
Consistent with Study 1, the model attributed the effects of number of stimuli to the 
threshold parameter (B). Unlike Study 1, but consistent with Palada et al. (2016), number of 
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stimuli did not affect non-decision time (ter). Deadline effects were explained by both rate (v) 
and non-decision time (ter), with no effect on threshold.  
The goodness-of-fit of the selected model is shown in Figure 9. The model provides an 
excellent account of accuracy, with little misfit and capturing the complex three-way 
interaction on accuracy described above, and the chance accuracy for targets under the 6s 
deadline. The fit for correct and error response time captures the trends across experimental 
conditions. As in Study 1, there was a systematic underestimation of slower response times 
for the 2-ship condition, although in Study 2 this was less pronounced and restricted to the 
0.9 quantile. Like Study 1, participants may have rechecked their decision prior to making an 
overt response, and hence extended response times at the tail end of the distribution. Again, 
the “top” model fit did not improve this underestimation. 
Experimental Effects on Parameters  
We analyzed model parameters using the same procedure as Study 1. Consistent with 
Study 1, threshold declined with an increase in the number of stimuli (2.71, 2.10, 1.69), c2(2) 
= 348.84, p < .001. For rate, all main effects of deadline, match factor and stimulus type were 
significant, as well as their interactions (ps < .001). We examined the main effect of deadline 
on rates, which would reflect strategic changes in effort or arousal. We found a significant 
main effect of deadline, such that mean rates increased with tighter deadlines (2.09, 1.64 and 
1.19). However, deadline also interacted with the match factor and stimulus-type, producing a 
three-way interaction (see Figure 10). The difference between the matching and mismatching 
accumulator rates, which reflects discriminability, decreased as the deadline became tighter, 
and this effect was stronger for targets than non-targets. 
Figure 10 shows an apparent decrease in match rates with tighter deadline for targets, 
whereas in all other cases an increasing effect was found. To examine the reliability of this 
pattern, we broke down the three-way interaction by examining the two-way interactions 
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between deadline and accumulator type on rates for each stimulus type. Both two-way 
interactions were significant (target: c2(2) = 285.14, p < .001; non-target: c2(2) = 40.34, p < 
.001). The two-way interactions were further broken down by examining the simple effects of 
accumulator type. Deadline had the opposite effect on the match and mismatch rates for 
targets; while the target match rate decreased with tighter deadlines, the target mismatch rate 
increased (ps < .001). For non-targets, match rates and mismatch rates increased with tighter 
deadlines, with the latter having a stronger positive effect (ps < .001).  
There was a significant interaction between stimulus type and match factor on rate 
variability, c2(1) = 4.93, p = .026. Figure 10 shows that rate variability was greater for the 
mismatching than matching accumulator, and this effect was stronger for non-target stimuli. 
Finally, we found a significant decrease in non-decision time with shorter deadlines, c2(2) = 
222.29, p < .001, and effect that was particularly marked for the 6s condition (0.14s), which 
was less than half the non-decision time for the 9s and 12s conditions (0.30s and 0.40s).  
Discussion 
In this study, we examined how people adapt to dynamic changes in both information 
load and deadline. We did this by randomly varying the number of stimuli and the time 
available to classify all stimuli presented within a trial. Initially, we were interested in 
whether the time pressure factors would both selectively influence threshold. Instead, we 
found distinct selective influence for both factors. Deadline selectively influenced rate, 
whereas, in line with Study 1 and Palada et al. (2016), the number of stimuli selectively 
influenced threshold. We examine these effects in turn.  
As in Study 1, participants strategically lowered their threshold in response to a greater 
number of stimuli in a trial to speed their decision and thus minimize non-responses; again, 
this strategy was not completely effective as non-response rate increased with a greater 
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number of ships. Participants also did not respond to the number of stimuli by changing their 
rate of information processing or by adopting a bias. Unlike Study 1, where time pressure 
conditions were blocked, and Palada et al. (2016), who probabilistically varied the number of 
ships in a 3-minute period, Study 2 randomized the presentation of time pressure conditions. 
A novel finding using this design is that participants could flexibly adjust their threshold in 
response to the number of stimuli with relatively little notice. Though threshold adjustments 
are an effortful process, participants appear to have devoted resources to strategically adjust 
their response caution given the time pressure demands for each trial. This highlights a good 
deal of flexibility in adapting to time pressure. However, the same sort of flexibility did not 
apply to the deadline manipulation. 
Participants struggled to adapt to tighter deadlines. While responses were faster, they 
became less accurate as the deadline became tighter. Indeed, it appears that the time pressure 
in the 6s condition was sufficient to cross participants’ redline, as accuracy declined 
drastically to the point of chance. However, this was only evident for targets. Participants 
were able to maintain a high degree of accuracy for non-targets under a 6s deadline, even 
though they were responding to non-targets as rapidly as to targets. These suggest that there 
is no single redline at which performance begins to deteriorate.  
Our modeling provided detailed insight into the strong effect of deadline, revealing that 
it was not due to a non-target response bias or a change in threshold. Rather, the modelling 
suggests that it was a consequence of two opposing processes that differentially affected the 
drift rates for the matching and mismatching accumulators. On one hand, the increase in the 
mean rate as deadlines became tighter suggests that participants tried to compensate for the 
shorter deadline by applying more effort. Assuming a constant discriminability (i.e., the 
difference between the matching and mismatching accumulator), an increase in effort or 
arousal should produce an increase in the drift rate for both matching and mismatching 
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accumulators, producing faster responses without any change in accuracy. However, the 
increase for the matching accumulator was weaker than for mismatching accumulator, 
suggesting that there was an opposing process at work. The decrease in the difference 
between the matching and mismatching rates as the deadline became tighter suggests that the 
quality of evidence that could be accumulated decreased as participants had less time 
available, and therefore discriminability declined. This effect was much stronger for targets 
than for non-targets. For non-targets, the increase in effort was sufficient to compensate for a 
modest reduction in quality of information, as indicated by the fact that the drift rate for the 
matching accumulator increased as the deadline became tighter. For targets, however, the 
increase in effort was not sufficient to compensate a more substantial reduction in quality of 
information, as indicated by the fact that the drift rate for the matching accumulator 
decreased as the deadline became tighter. 
 Finally, tighter deadlines speeded non-decision times. One possibility is that this was a 
result of participants attempting to adapt to the extreme difficulties experienced with 
responding to targets, by becoming more efficient in motor planning and effectively 
executing a response when less time was available. Another possibility is that they rushed 
their encoding process, particularly for the shortest deadline where non-decision time was 
very fast. This rushed encoding might, in turn, be expected to result in poorer quality 
evidence being available from the stimulus.  
As for Study 1, we examined the effect of ship ordering (first ship vs. subsequent ships) 
on non-decision time by re-fitting the AIC selected model and allowing the ship order factor 
to influence non-decision time. The more complex model significantly improved fit over the 
AIC selected model, c2(180) = 18189, p < .001, and retained the effect of number of ships on 
threshold and the effects of deadline on rates. Consistent with the additional analyses in 
Study 1, the non-decision time of ships presented first were significantly longer than 
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subsequently presented ships (0.75s vs 0.15s, respectively; c2(1) = 147.06, p < .001). There 
was also an interaction between deadline and ship order, c2(2) = 9.67, p = .008. As shown in 
Figure 11, the decrease in non-decision time with tighter deadlines was considerably stronger 
for the first ship compared to other ships, though simple effects slope analyses indicated that 
both downward trends were significant (ps < .001). The general decline in non-decision times 
is consistent with the possibility that participants rushed encoding time with tighter deadlines. 
The stronger decline for ships presented first could be accounted for by the delay in the 
ability to encode features on the ship as it transitioned into the screen.  
 Our modeling suggests that participants adapted to changes in information load and 
deadline in different ways. Like Study 1, participants adjusted their threshold in response to 
the number of ships, which partially attenuated the effects of the number of ships on 
performance, though non-responses increased with more ships. Nonetheless, this strategy was 
successful in avoiding the redline. In contrast, deadline had a strong effect on the quality of 
information, particularly for targets. This effect was due the compromise of stimulus 
encoding. While participants responded to deadline by exerting effort, this response was 
unsuccessful, as performance declined drastically, and thus participants crossed the redline in 
the 6s condition.  
General Discussion 
Across two experiments we manipulated time pressure via stimulus complexity, the 
number of stimuli, and deadline. Our aim was to examine how individuals adapt to these 
changes in time pressure. Our review of the literature identified several ways that people can 
adapt to increases in time pressure: Increasing the rate of information processing, prioritizing 
speed over accuracy, and adopting a response bias. It is difficult to infer how people adapt to 
time pressure based on the analysis of behavioural measures such as accuracy or mean 
response time alone, because these different responses can interact in complex ways, and the 
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effects may be obscured by changes in difficulty. We addressed this problem using the LBA 
(Brown & Heathcote, 2008) to model accuracy and all aspects of response time distribution 
simultaneously. The LBA conceptualizes the rate and quality of information processing via 
rate parameters for correct and incorrect responses, which reflects changes in effort and/or 
arousal; speed-accuracy tradeoffs via the threshold parameter, which reflects changes in 
response caution; and response biases via the difference in thresholds between response 
alternatives, which reflects a strategic preference towards a response choice.  
To date, only one study has applied evidence accumulation modeling to a complex task 
involving a time pressure manipulation. Palada et al. (2016) found that the LBA provided a 
good description of accuracy and the time between decisions, and that an increase in the 
number of stimuli led to a decrease in response caution. However, the study had several 
potential shortcomings, including allowing participants to switch attention between stimuli 
and tasks and unbalanced heterogeneity of stimulus difficulty, and examined the effects of 
only one time pressure manipulation. We addressed these shortcomings using a more 
controlled design, so that participants had to make decisions serially, and we used a balanced 
manipulation of stimulus difficulty. We also examined the effects of three different time 
pressure factors.  
We used thorough model selection techniques outlined by Donkin et al. (2011) to 
examine whether the same psychological mechanisms mediated the effects of different time 
pressure factors. We found clear support for this being not the case, with each of the three 
factors that we manipulated to change time pressure having a distinctive profile of effects. In 
line with Palada et al. (2016), in both studies, we found that the number of stimuli selectively 
influenced a strategic factor, the threshold amount of information required for a response, 
with no effect on factors related to the rate of information processing and the quality of the 
evidence obtained from the stimuli.  
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Study 1 replicated the post-hoc analyses reported by Palada et al., (2016), finding that 
stimulus complexity selectively influenced the quality of evidence. Complexity had no effect 
on the overall rate of information processing. There was also no effect of complexity on 
thresholds, just as would be expected in simple choice tasks with quick responses. We had 
speculated that, given the much slower decisions in our task, participants may have been able 
to adjust their thresholds in an attempt to compensate the greater difficulty of decisions with 
more complex stimuli, but this does not appear to have been the case. We did find a lower 
threshold for target than non-target responses, which was likely a strategic attempt to 
compensate for the greater overall difficulty of target stimuli. Once again, however, this 
threshold-mediated effect did not change with stimulus complexity. 
In Study 2, we found that deadline influenced the rate of information processing and the 
quality of evidence, but had no effect on threshold. Our findings are contrary to Dambacher 
and Hübner (2015), who examined the effects of deadlines on decision processes in a simple 
choice task. Dambacher and Hübner (2015) found that threshold declined with tighter 
deadlines. Further, while we observed an increase in mean rate with tighter deadlines, they 
observed a decrease in rate. In our study, deadline had a strong effect on the quality of 
evidence, particularly for targets. Dambacher and Hübner (2015) used a relatively simple 
flanker task, with the greatest error rate being 22.5%. This decline in performance may have 
been insufficient to motivate participants to protect accuracy by increasing their effort. 
Comparing this to our study, with targets approaching near-chance performance, it appears 
that this decline in performance may have been sufficient to motivate participants to protect 
their accuracy by exerting effort in response to tighter deadlines. We suggest that participants 
in our study were unwilling to compound the effects of deadline on accuracy by also reducing 
their response threshold. The decline in rate observed in Dambacher and Hübner, which 
reflects degradation in the quality of evidence being extracted from the stimulus, is consistent 
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with our observed three-way interaction on rates showing poorer discriminability as deadlines 
became tighter.  
A potential reason for the large increase in the rate of accumulation of evidence for a 
non-target response under extreme time pressure when in fact the stimulus was a target is that 
participants failed to encode all of the ships features, and then took the corresponding lack of 
evidence for the presence of target features as supporting the stimulus being a non-target. 
Further, it is possible that target features are encoded more slowly than non-target features so 
that reduced encoding time is associated with an increased amount of non-target evidence 
relative to target evidence. This explanation is supported by the very short non-decision time 
estimate for the 6s condition, which was less than half the non-decision time for the 9s 
condition. This short encoding time is consistent with the potential for failures in the 
encoding process, which in turn causes the quality of target evidence to be poor. The 
corresponding lack of difference between the evidence accumulation rates for target and non-
target accumulations is then ultimately responsible for the observed chance accuracy with 
target stimuli at the shortest deadline.  
These findings not only provide an example of how the LBA can provide insights into 
the processes underlying the redline phenomenon, but also illustrates why the concept of the 
redline has proven so elusive (Hart & Wickens, 2010). The redline refers to the point at 
which demands exceed resources, and performance deteriorates. However, there are multiple 
ways in which individuals can respond to time pressure: Increasing effort, changing strategy, 
or adjusting response bias. The use of such strategy is determined by the motives and goals of 
the individual, and suggests that there is not a common redline for workload, as the point at 
which performance declines depends on how individuals respond to demands. Without an 
explicit model that can quantify such strategies, it is difficult to explain why performance 
does or does not decline as workload increases.  
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The LBA can also be used to identify the effectiveness, or failures, of the strategies 
used to protect performance in high workload situations. For example, where performance 
does not suffer in high workload situations, the LBA can be used to explain how performance 
was protected. In line with this, the LBA could also be used to predict when performance will 
degrade considerably in a given situation with the use of a specific cognitive strategy or 
processes. In our case, it appears that performance deteriorated when the deadline was 
decreased to 6s, because participants did not allow sufficient time to encode the stimuli, and 
increases in effort were not sufficient to compensate for the resulting decline in the quality of 
stimulus information. 
Accumulate-to-threshold models suggest that there is no discrete point at which 
performance deteriorates. However, these models can be exploited to identify individual 
differences in the way that people respond to task demands, and to predict how performance 
will change as demands continue to change into the future. However, future work is 
necessary to identify whether accumulate-to-threshold models can explain performance 
decrements that are associated with underload, when the person has to maintain attention on 
task for extended periods of time (Young et al., 2015). There is promising work in similar 
areas; for example, McVay and Kane (2012) found that mind wandering was reflected by 
increases in the LBA’s drift variability parameter (sv).  
Although the work successfully extends accumulate-to-threshold models of simple, 
static perceptual decisions to a more complex setting (see also Palada et al., 2016), more 
work is required to address even more realistic and applied areas. For example, it is likely 
there would be a need to account for the possibility of repeated attention switching during the 
course of a decision (for an initial approach in a simple task see Holmes, Trueblood, & 
Heathcote, 2016). Nonetheless, our work illustrates the benefits of applying the LBA to 
understand human performance in dynamic, multi-stimulus environments. The LBA could be 
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used in practice to identify how operators manage their workload, which has implications for 
system design, processes and procedures, such as identifying cases where task support is 
required. Similarly, the model could be used to identify how technologies and interfaces 
influence decision-making processes. The model could also be used for predictive purposes, 
such as simulating human performance under novel or unsafe conditions – as we show, this 
approach appears viable even in situations where the operator may be overloaded.  
While it may be interesting to apply other successful accumulate-to-threshold models to 
complex tasks, such as the diffusion model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008), the accumulator class 
of models, particularly the LBA, show more promise in complex applied tasks because of the 
versatility in model architecture. For example, Strickland et al. (submitted) applied the LBA 
to understand the processes underlying prospective memory, and included a task with more 
than two possible responses; Trueblood, Brown & Heathcote (2014) extended the LBA to 
account for stimuli with multiple attributes; Bushmakin et al. (2017) extended the LBA to 
account for choices contingent on the combination of attributes; and the LBA has been 
extended to account for cases where the evidence changes during the course of the decision 
(Holmes et al., 2016). In addition to the current paper, all of these previous studies illustrate 
the ability of the LBA to account for complex decisions which could be extended to complex 
environments.  
Our results also suggest a novel type of speed-accuray tradeoff, where increased speed 
associated with decreased non-decision time also results in decreased accuracy. These 
findings have broader application for evidence accumulation models, providing a link 
between the quality of evidence with the time spent encoding a stimulus. They suggest that 
evidence accumulation rates are determined not only by stimulus factors outside participants’ 
control, but also by stategic factors related to the time, and perhaps attentional resources, 
devoted to extracting evidence from a stimulus that is relevant to the requried decision. 
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This novel type of encoding-mediated speed-accuracy tradeoff has very different 
applied implications from the traditional threhold-mediated mechanism, and has the potential 
to provide important insights into the causes of the redline phenomenon (Young et al., 2015), 
and hence how it can be dealt with when it occurs in practice. In the present paradigm, for 
example, our results suggest that if more accurate target detection were critical to successful 
performance, the most effective adaptive strategies would encourage participants to devote 
more time to encoding target features.           
In summary, workload is not a direct function of task demands. Rather, the effects of 
task demands depend on the way that the individual adapts to those demands (Loft et al., 
2007; Parasuraman & Hancock, 2001; Young et al., 2015). Such volitional and effortful 
behaviours are motivated by the need maintain or achieve a certain level of performance as 
task demands increase, and to keep workload manageable. Without the use of adaptive 
behaviours in response to increased demands, performance will necessarily degrade as the 
individual approaches the redline. Further, the effectiveness of a given response partially 
determines how quickly the individual will reach the redline (e.g., Sperandio, 1978). Our 
studies illustrate the importance of accounting for how individuals adapt to task demands, and 
provide evidence that they are sensitive to the distinct aspects of time pressure, using a 
variety of mechanisms to adapt to different factors. They also show that investigating 
adaptive behaviour using cognitive models can further our understanding of how individuals 
cope, and fail to cope, with the effects of time pressure, and provide novel insights into how 
to improve human performance under high and even excessive workload.  
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Figure 1.  The standard LBA model applied to a target-detection task. 
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Figure 2. Screenshot of UAV task, with a non-target (red arrow) and target (green arrow) 
responses, a ship requiring classification in the unmasked lane, and a masked unclassified 
ship indicated with an outlined, unfilled arrow. Note. Noise and fog overlay are reduced for 
illustrative purposes.  
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Figure 3. An example target ship with seven features. Note. The superstructure in the centre 
of the deck was present on all ships.  
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Figure 4. Study 1: Interaction between stimulus, difficulty, and ships in trial on non-response 
rates, with 95% within-subject confidence intervals (Morey, 2008).
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Figure 5. Study 1: The three-way interaction between stimulus type, complexity and number of stimuli on errors rates (left panel) and the two-
way interaction excluding stimulus type on mean correct response time (right panel), with 95% within-subject confidence intervals (Morey, 
2008). 
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Figure 6. Study 1: Fits of the AIC-selected LBA model to error rates, correct, and error response time distribution data with 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 7. Study 1: Mean rate estimates for the AIC selected model, with within-subject 
standard errors (Morey, 2008). 
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Figure 8. Study 2: Plots of the joint effects of stimulus type, deadline and number of stimuli 
on error rates (top row) and correct response time (bottom row). Error bars show 95% within-
subject confidence intervals (Morey, 2008). 
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Figure 9. Study 2: Fits of the AIC-selected LBA model to error rates, correct, and error response time distribution data with 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 10. Study 2: Mean rate (left graph) and rate variability (right graph) estimates for the 
AIC selected models, with within-subject standard errors (Morey, 2008). 
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Figure 11. Study 2: Non-decision time estimates for the additional model fit, having the 
parametrization of the AIC selected model, though allowing non-decision time to also be 
influenced by ship order factor, with within-subject standard errors (Morey, 2008). 
  
Deadline
No
n−
De
cis
ion
 T
im
e 
(te
r)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
6s 9s 12s
First ship Other ships
EVIDENCE ACCUMULATION IN A TIME PRESSURED TASK    61 
 
 
Table 1.  
LBA top model parameterization for Study 1 and Study 2, and the number of parameters (NP). 
Experimental factors are stimulus (S), ships in trial (NS), complexity (C) and deadline (D). 
Accumulator factors are match (M) and response (R). Total refers the total number of 
parameters in the model. 
  LBA Parameters  
  
Start point 
variability 
(A) 
Threshold 
(B) 
Rate 
(v) 
Rate 
variability 
(sv) 
Non-decision 
time  
(ter) 
Total 
NP 
Study 1 
Factors - C, NS, R C, NS, M, S M, S C, NS  
NF 1 18 36 3 9 67 
Study 2 
Factors - D, NS, R D, NS, M, S M, S D, NS  
NF 1 18 36 3 9 67 
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Table 2.  
Study 1 analysis of variance results for conventional moment-based performance measures.  
  Error Rate Mean Correct RT Mean Error RT SD Correct RT SD Error RT 
Effect df χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p 
S 1 80.78 <.001 5.70 .017 2.45 .117 1.61 .204 0.95 .331 
NS 2 18.14 <.001 440.46 <.001 67.99 <.001 13.59 .001 9.73 .008 
C 2 5.11 .078 20.41 <.001 1.96 .375 5.04 .081 5.93 .052 
S·NS 2 5.69 .058 2.79 .248 0.46 .795 1.94 .379 1.10 .576 
S·C 2 1.63 .442 4.91 .086 0.73 .696 3.04 .219 4.20 .123 
NS·C 4 4.39 .356 13.20 .010 5.38 .250 3.11 .540 7.32 .120 
S·NS·C 4 14.09 .007 3.06 .548 5.34 .254 3.50 .478 5.21 .267 
Note. S=stimulus type, NS=number of stimuli in trial, C=complexity, RT=response time. 
Ship configuration has been omitted from the table since it served as a control variable.  
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Table 3.  
Study 1 LBA fits summed over participants. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), p 
is the number of parameters per participant. Model factors are number of stimuli in trial 
(NS), complexity (C), stimulus (S), match (M), and response (R). 
 LBA Parameters  Model Fit 
Variant Threshold (B) 
Rate 
(v) 
Rate 
variability 
(sv) 
Non-decision 
time  
(ter) 
 
p Deviance AIC 
Top C, NS, R C, NS, M, S M, S C, NS  3819 129126 136764 
AIC NS, R C, M, S M, S C, NS  1767 129885 136511 
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Table 4.  
Study 2 analysis of variance results for conventional moment-based performance measures.  
  Error Rate Mean Correct RT Mean Error RT SD Correct RT SD Error RT 
Effect df χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p 
S 1 339.24 <.001 2.67 .102 0.20 .655 1.60 .206 3.76 .053 
NS 2 17.51 <.001 224.69 <.001 98.13 <.001 2.19 .334 14.71 .001 
D 2 7.99 .018 411.56 <.001 37.26 <.001 31.41 <.001 0.05 .976 
S·NS 2 7.03 .030 1.65 .438 3.45 .178 0.95 .621 5.01 .082 
S·D 2 227.89 <.001 86.02 <.001 0.49 .783 5.67 .059 6.07 .048 
NS·D 4 10.69 .030 7.95 .093 11.93 .018 2.86 .581 8.94 .063 
S·NS·D 4 11.23 .024 15.43 .004 2.05 .726 0.39 .983 6.40 .171 
Note. S=stimulus type, NS=number of stimuli in trial, D=deadline, RT=response time. Ship 
configuration has been omitted from the table since it served as a control variable.   
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Table 5.  
Study 2 LBA fits summed over participants. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), p 
is the number of parameters per participant. Model factors are number of stimuli in trial 
(NS), deadline (D), stimulus (S), match (M), and response (R). 
 LBA Parameters  Model Fit 
Variant Threshold (B) 
Rate 
(v) 
Rate 
variability 
(sv) 
Non-decision 
time  
(ter) 
 
p Deviance AIC 
Top D, NS, R D, NS, M, S M, S D, NS  4020 127103 135143 
AIC NS D, M, S M, S D  1320 127921 130561 
 
 
